Sentence examples for F���that from high-quality English sources.

• For any particular e. m. f.

• "I'm sorry, but f--- that.

• That is, one has misidentified which thing is F.

• Zegerman wanted to know in what nineteen-thirties comedy was everything “F this” and “F that.”

• So now I'm like, f--- that.

• The last time Lexus stuffed a naturally aspirated V8 into the IS compact sedan was 2007 in the IS F.

• There is no judgment aggregation rule F that jointly satisfies the above conditions that is not a dictatorship.

• This account assumes that if being F is predicable of a, there is a state of affairs a’s being F that ontologically depends on them.

Use F���that in a sentence.

• By this is meant a function f that takes us from a pair ⟨p,q⟩ of sentences to a set f(⟨p,q⟩) of pairs of alternatives (perhaps possible worlds).

• That is, there is a reading of “Jane believes that she is F” that does not imply self-consciousness on Jane’s part.

• An arrow f ∶ A → B is called an isomorphism if there is an arrow g ∶ B → A inverse to f—that is, such that g ○ f = 1A and f ○ g = 1B.

• The aim of D8 is to establish, for a variety of different properties F, that if the one is not, then the others are neither F nor con-F.

• For the biology geeks on the podcast, V-E-G-F, that is a protein that we all have the instruction in our DNA, which basically tells your body to make a new blood vessel.

• That is, an existential claim that there is an F that is G, plus a signal that this is given information, is often enough to allow us to implicate that there is unique F that is G.

• Say that an interpretation of LAr satisfies the formula function X with respect to a sequence f (that assigns values from A to the original variables of LAr) if and only if:

• So the second sentences of discourses of the form of (40) ought to have readings on which they mean the unique F that is G is H (Russellian) and on which they mean every F that is G is H (numberless).

F���that sentence examples

• To make this notion of adequacy more precise, we define a realization (sometimes called translation or interpretation) to be a function f that assigns to each propositional atom of modal logic a sentence of arithmetic, where

• Further, as a result of the Success postulate, the incoming formula F that brings about the belief change is assumed to be completely trustworthy: the agent accepts without question the incoming information F and incorporates it into her set of beliefs as per the belief change process.

• In order to solve it, we need to find a relation between the state of affairs a’s being F and a and being F that (i) does not make a and being F parts of the state of affairs, (ii) allows one to distinguish between necessarily co-obtaining states of affairs, and (iii) distinguishes the state of affairs a’s being F from other objects that, intuitively speaking, involve a and being F.

• All three theses might seem contentious today. (1) seems to allude to Phaedo 100e’s notorious thesis about the role of the Form of F-ness in any x’s being F—that x is F “by the Form of F-ness.” (2) looks contentious because it implies (3); and (3) brings me to a second question about 142a–145e (which is also an important question about the whole dialogue): What is the meaning of the Greek word that I am translating as “knowledge,” epistêmê?