Russellian physicalism is different.
Leibniz might be the first Russellian monist.
Russellian monism can be seen as breaking that silence.
The strongest Russellian contents include both objects and properties.
However, Millian-Russellian semantic theories also face some problems.
Some find Russellian monism in works by others in the modern period as well.
Some traditional physicalist theories conflict with other aspects of Russellian monism.
The result is a variety of Russellian monism known as Russellian panprotopsychism.
Russellian monists usually support their theory by arguing that it has significant theoretical benefits.
One could find views that resemble Russellian monism in certain respects throughout the history of philosophy.
Alternatively, one might give up the claim that Russellian monists are committed to structuralism about physics.
Much of the recent literature on Russellian monism focuses on the physicalist variety, often called Russellian physicalism (Montero 2015).
Thus, just as Russellian propositions correspond many-one to intensions, Fregean propositions correspond many-one to Russellian propositions.
Given Russellian monism, terms for the basic entities in physical theory, such as “mass” and “charge”, perhaps refer to quiddities, to entities that have quiddities.
Thus, we get panpsychist and panprotopsychist forms of the view, which we can call “Russellian panpsychism” and “Russellian panprotopsychism” respectively.
Much (though by no means all) of the recent discussion of Russellian monism focuses on Russellian physicalism, on which quiddities are physical properties.
This is to endorse a Fregean response to Frege’s puzzle, and to abandon the Russellian approach to semantics (or, at least, to abandon Millian-Russellian semantics).
Say that a definite description has a Russellian denotation when the Russellian conditions for the description to have a denotation are fulfilled; that is, when there is at least one individual satisfying the relevant predicate, but no more than one.
Russellian monists are motivated by the need to characterise the intrinsic nature of matter (This issue is discussed in great detail below in the section on the “Intrinsic nature argument”; reading that section will help one get a grip on Russellian monism and its motivation).
What the consideration of Russellian Monism shows is that (i) new versions of neutral monism are currently being developed that borrow relatively little from the ideas of traditional neutral monism; (ii) but even the most developed versions of Russellian neutral monism face considerable problems.
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