This distinction motivates different versions of non-reductive physicalism.
Positive answers to this question come in both reductive and non-reductive varieties.
The second function is to ground a non-reductive explanation of the normativity of law.
Like the property dualist, the non-reductive physicalist holds that mental properties are not physical.
The materialism is non-reductive, in that works of art have properties that physical objects generally don't.
The category of connective unity helps accommodate and bring attention to the diversity of non-reductive accounts.
But surely any adequate formulation of non-reductive physicalism should take a stand on whether there really are mental facts.
Hence, in this form, non-reductive physicalism is compatible with a weak form of ontological pluralism at least of properties or kinds.
According to non-reductive physicalism, special properties are not type-identical with any strictly physical properties, even though they supervene on them.
We might expect that reductive realists would always answer this question in the affirmative, whereas non-reductive realists would always answer it in the negative.
Even if one does not find this sort of appeal to psychology implausible, the non-reductive realists would seem to have a more satisfying reply to our original question.
Some non-reductive views, already mentioned, see pre-reflective consciousness (see §3.2), or the sense of ownership (see §3.3) as necessary conditions of consciousness (see Zahavi 2005).
In light of this, it is perhaps unsurprising that several philosophers have argued that ethical supervenience theses support reductionist forms of ethical realism against non-reductive forms.
Now as most non-reductive realists recognize, there is a difficulty posed by their position—namely, that of giving a perspicuous account of the nature of paradigmatic relations or relational accidents.
In response, advocates of non-reductive physicalism respond that there is nothing wrong with such an apparent duplication of causes if it is also specified that the latter metaphysically supervene on the former.
In §4 I’ll consider whether determinables may be as fundamental as determinates, and whether certain of the non-reductive accounts to follow are compatible with fundamental as well as non-fundamental determinables.
In the end, therefore, it would appear that the non-reductive realists do have something to say in response to the reductivists’ worries about the mysterious nature of relations and their appeals to considerations of theoretical parsimony.
On the other side stand “non-reductive” physicalists, who hold that the causal efficacy of special causes will be respected as long as the properties they involve are “realized by” physical properties, even if they are not reductively identified with them.
In addition, the notion of reduction obviously plays an important role in the characterization of non-reductive physicalism; a careful investigation of what reductionism consists in is required to adequately determine in what respects, if any, a theory of mind could be coherently both non-reductivist and materialist about the mental.
Given the role essences play in individuation, this approach promises to characterize determinable events in properly non-reductive terms, at both the type and token levels, and might be extended to a more general non-reductive account of determinables, capable of accommodating the range of motivations for irreducible determinables.
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Given the role essences play in individuation this approach promises to characterize determinable events in properly non-reductive terms at both the type and token levels and might be extended to a more general non-reductive account of determinables capable of accommodating the range of motivations for irreducible determinables