Section 2 noted that there are few extended defenses of ethical supervenience.
Naturalists and non-naturalists typically share a commitment to supervenience.
Finally, how should we decide between ontological and ascriptive supervenience theses?
—seemed to accept something like weak but not strong conceptual supervenience of the ethical.
Occasionally philosophers appeal to weak supervenience rather than strong supervenience.
It is clear that strong individual supervenience entails global supervenience (see Kim 1984).
Both weak and strong individual supervenience are clear cases of single domain supervenience.
Kim thus concluded that global supervenience fails to entail weak or strong individual supervenience.
As the names indicate, strong individual supervenience is stronger than weak individual supervenience.
Bennett also argues that in such a case even weak global supervenience entails strong individual supervenience.
We saw above that there is some support for thinking that ethical supervenience is a strong supervenience thesis.
Regional supervenience is a form of individual supervenience that takes the individuals to be regions of space-time.
In general, such supervenience theses are too weak to support the sorts of arguments from ethical supervenience that philosophers have made.
It is easy to see that strong global supervenience entails intermediate global supervenience, which in turn entails weak global supervenience.
It then considers arguments that use ethical supervenience as a premise, and doubts that ethical supervenience has the sort of significance suggested by these arguments.
(The literature on supervenience contains several other variations; see the entry on supervenience for an excellent introduction, from which this entry adopts some of the formulations below.
Weak and strong coincident-friendly supervenience count as kinds of multiple-domain supervenience, but they differ from Kim’s weak and strong multiple domain supervenience in at least one important respect.
However, weak and intermediate global supervenience are not equivalent to strong individual supervenience even when extrinsic properties are let into the base—more precisely, when the base is closed under the relevant property-forming operations.
In any case, those who assert a weak or intermediate global supervenience thesis while denying the corresponding strong global supervenience thesis need to provide an explanation of why weak or intermediate global supervenience holds that does not entail that strong global supervenience holds.
If all of these results are right, then weak individual supervenience, strong individual supervenience, weak global supervenience, intermediate global supervenience, and strong global supervenience are all equivalent in the special case when A and B are sets of intrinsic properties.
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